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PRESENT STATUS-APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL LAW TO CASES
INVOLVING UNFAIR COMPETITION
Prior to the case of Ere v. Tompkins,' the question of whether
state or federal substantive law applied to cases involving unfair compe-
tition was never presented to the courts. The problem of "choice of law"
never arose -before the opinion of Brandeis in the Erie case, because of
the "general federal common law" that evolved under the doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson.' Therefore, as a result of the Erie decision, since 1938
a great problem has been presented to the federal courts, that is, they
may no longer base their holdings on the decisional law of all the states,
for they must base it merely on the law of the state where the cause of
action arose. The next question to be asked is, what is the effect of the
Erie case in the field of unfair competition? The effect has generally
been held to be disastrous, since it forced the federal courts to follow state
precedents, both of lower and upper courts, of great antiquity and
doubtful validity. However, not only are the state decisions antique and
doubtful, but also, many states have little or no decisional law concerning
unfair competition.
The relationship of the Erie case to the law of trademarks and un-
fair competition presents not one but a series of interrelated problems.
The opinion of Brandeis caused commentators and the lower federel
courts to search for a basis upon which federal law could be applied in
unfair competition cases. Since Erie v. Tompkins decided that state law
must be applied in cases concerning diversity of citizenship, other concepts
were attempted to be made the basis for applying federal law. The con-
cepts, that have been attempted to be made the basis of applying federal
law, have never been directly passed upon by the United States Supreme
Court, either pro or con.
A. THE EFFECT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT
The first view was set forth by Professor Bunn in an article entitled
The National Law of Unfair Competition.' He advocated that the
Federal Trade Commission Act created a federal private cause of action
for unfair competition, in which federal law was to be applied. The only
argument that has been made by a judge against such a theory, that is,
that the Federal Trade Commission Act created a private cause of action,
was that Congress showed their intention to put such things in the hands
of a commission by expressly providing for the Federal Trade Commis-
sion.4 Professor Bunn had an answer for this. He proclaimed that the
Act makes all unfair methods of competion illegal but only gives the
3304 U.s. 64 (1938).
241 U.s. (16 Pet.) 1 (1942).
3 62 HARv. L. REv. 987 (1949).
4 National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499
(D. Mass. 1942) aff'd., 140 F. 2d 618 (1st Cir. 1944) (unfair competition issue not
raised on appeal).
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Commission the power to act where the public interest was involved. The
Act does not state that the Commission has exclusive jurisdictions but
neither does it state that section 5 of the Act creates a private remedy.
It therefore may be conceded that the Commission has no authority to
enforce private remedies, but rights based on a federal statute should be
enforced by the courts. The Act nowhere forbids such action.
B. PENDENT JURISDICTION
The second view involves the problem of pendent jurisdiction. In
the case of Hum v. Oursler,5 it was determined that the federal courts
had jurisdiction of a claim of unfair competition joined to a substantial
federal claim. Each ground must be distinct in support of one cause of
action and not two distinct causes of action. The difficulty in the appli-
cation of the rule has been in determining when the unfair competition
claim is so related to the federal claim as to constitute one "cause of
action". 6 When Congress passed the new Judicial Code in 1948, it en-
acted section 1338(b).' Fhe intent of Congress was to give statutory
authority for the Hum doctrine, but the result has -been that the wording
of the statute is very vague. Our problem at hand, however, is not what
is a substantial and related claim, 'but is what law, either state or federal,
is to be applied to the pendent ground. There is a split in authority, be-
cause the United States Supreme Court has never made a direct holding
in point. In Bulova Watch Co. v. Stolzberg,8 the court held that all
federal courts should apply "federal law" where a claim for unfair
competition was joined with a substantial and related claim under the
copyright, patent, or trade mark statutes. The opposite view, however,
was taken in National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinel-Wright Go.,9 that
is "state law" controls the pendent ground as to what is considered
unfair competitioni. The latter view is probably the better. The pro-
ponents of applying the Erie doctrine to pendent jurisdiction cases, base
their argument upon the axiom that since the pendent ground is derivative
of a right arising under state law, the applicable state law should be
imposed by the federal courts. This writer also tends to agree with the
latter view, primarily on the basis of Brandeis' words in the Erie case,
..... "except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state".
Following this quotation, it seems that pendent as well as diversity cases
were included.
"5289 U.S. 238 (1933).
6 37 MNN. L. Rxv. 268 (1953).
7The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and
related claim under the copyright, patent or trademark laws.
869 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1947), following the argument suggested by
Zlinkoff, Erie 'v. Tompkins: In Relation to the Law of Trademarks and Unfair
Competition, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 955 (1942).
9 See note 4 supra.
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C. THE EFFECT OF THE LANHAM ACT
The third view is the result of broad interpretation of recent trade
mark legislation. Mr. Justice Holmes, in Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Public
Service Comm.."0 said "[Als to trademarks and trade names, the subject
matter in this instance is peculiarly one that calls for uniform law. If
each state were permitted to diversely control such areas of law, it would
largely defeat the purpose of registering a trademark with the federal
government." As a result of these words, it is conceded that Congress
when passing the Lanham Act intended to occupy the field of claims,
resulting from such trademark infringement. But the problem immedi-
ately at hand is whether Congress, when they enacted the said legislation
intended to include the area of unfair competition along with the rights
and remedies provided for in cases of infringement. The intent of
Congress was set out in section 45" of the Act---"the intent of this act
is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress." Broad compre-
hensive statutory remedies are provided for in the Act, "for infringement
of marks". 2 These statutory remedies include broad injunctive relief as
well as damages for infringement and for unfair competition in the use
of any registered trademark. But what if the trademark is not registered,
does a federal court still have jurisdiction; are the remedies still available?
This is an area in which a great controversy has arisen concerning the
construction of the Lanham Act. The best manner by which this problem
could most easily be discussed is to break down the diversity of opinions
into three major categorical areas.
(1) First of all the view of the Ninth Circuit as originally set out
in Stauffer v. Exley. 3 In this case, the plaintiff, using an un-
registered trade name of "Stauffer System, Inc.", sued the
defendant, a citizen of the same state, in a federal district court,
alleging unfair competition, in interstate commerce, of the
defendant's use of the name "Stauffer" and in his use of ad-
vertising similar to that of the plaintiff so as to mislead the
public. The district court dismissed the claim for want of
jurisdiction but on appeal it was reversed, proclaiming that the
complaint states a claim under sections 44(b), (h) and (i) of
the Lanham Act.14 The significance "of the holding is that the
Lanham Act creates a federal cause of action for unfair compe-
tition even though unrelated to a registered trademark or
trade name, and gives the district courts jurisdiction without
regard to diversity of citizenship or amount in controversy.
The rationale of the court in support of such a finding was
10250 U.S. 566 (1919).
1160 Stat. 443, 15 U.S.C. §1127 (1946).
12 Section 44(h), 15 U.S.C. §1126(h) (1946).
13 184 F. 2d 962 (9th Cir. 1950).
14 60 Stat. 441, 15 U.S.C. §1126 (b), (h) and (i) (1946).
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previously profounded by Professor Rogers." Where there is
present the requisite effect on interstate commerce, the Lanham
Act creates substantive rights and remedies available to United
States citizens irrespective of a registered trademark or trade
name. 6 The federal jurisdiction was conferred by section 39
for actions arising under the Act, and the statement in section
45 that it was the intent of Congress to prevent unfair compe-
tition. Three interrelated subsections of section 44 were used
to substantiate its conclusion: (a) section 44(b) gave to for-
eigners the benefits of the Act insofar as it was necessary to
give effect to certain conventions and treaties to which the
United States was a party; (b) section 44(h) gave the parties
described in subsection (b) a right to protection against unfair
competition; (c) section 44(i) states: "citizens or residents of
the United States shall have the same benefits as are granted
by this section to persons described in subsection (b) .......
granted to United States citizens a right of protection against
unfair competition among themselves-this in effect creating a
federal law of unfair competition. The true attitude at the
present time in the Ninth Circuit has not changed, but a dis-
sentience has been presented. In Panaview Door and Window
Co. v. Fred Van Ness et al.,1 7 District Judge Hall stated,
"If the matter were before me initially, I would follow the
reasoning in the Second"8 and Third' 9 Circuits as I think it is
more sound than the expressions of the Ninth Circuit cases.
However, it is my duty to follow the decisions of the Ninth
Circuit."
(2) The view of the Second Circuit was best presented in Amercan
Auto Ass'n (Incorporated) et al. r. Spiegal.2 9 The plaintiff
brought an action for trademark infringement and for un-
fair competition in relation to the defendant's display of the
plaintiff's registered trademark, A.A.A., in front of defendant's
15 To be found in an introduction to ROBERT, THE NEW TRADEMARK MANUAL
168-80 (1947).
16 Followed in Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F. 2d 923
(9th Cir. 1951) ; Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., Limited, 198 F. 2d 339 (9th Cir.
1952); Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Hilton Lite Corp., 111 F. Supp. 691
(N.D. Cal. 1953); Ross-Whitney Corp. et al. v. Smith Kline and French Labora-
tories, 207 F. 2d 190 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Lane Bryant Inc. v. Glassman, 95 F. Supp.
320 (E.D. Mo. 1951); see Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., 194- F. 2d 416,
422 (2d Cir. 1952) (dissenting opinion). An obiter approval of the Stauffer
doctrine was given in In re Lyndale Farms, 38 C.C.P.A. 825, 186 F. 2d 723, 88
U.S.P.Q, 377 (1951).
17 124 F. Supp. 329 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
18 American Auto Ass'n. (Incorporated) et al. v. Spiegal, 205 F. 2d 771
(2d Cir. 1953), Cert. denied 346 U.S. 887, 99 U.S.P.Q. 490.
19 L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F. 2d 649 (3d. Cir. 1954).
20 See note 18, supra.
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gasoline station. The defendant denied infringement and also
asserted the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the federal
court. The defendant's defense was upheld on the basis that
a substantial federal claim of infringement was not shown,
to come within section 1338(b) of the Judicial Code, 2 nor
do the provisions of the Lanham Act 2 confer upon the federal
courts jurisdiction in actions involving unfair competition.
The intent of Congress was not to create a federal law of un-
fair competition. 23 The reasoning behind the decision of the
Second Circuit was that subsection (i) permits only a suit by
an American against a foreigner for the purpose of equalizing
an American's rights against the foreigner to the same degree
as the foreigner has against an American. Therefore, a suit
wholly between Americans does not come within the purview
of this section. This idea had been previously proclaimed in Old
Reading Brewery v. Lebanon Valley Brewing Co.,"4 where a
plaintiff filed a suit in a state court for infringement of an
unregistered trademark and for unfair competition. Defendant
attempted removal to a federal court on the basis of the
Lanham Act, but the court refused. The basis for refusing
jurisdiction was that there was no showing that any claim or
right in the action arose under the laws of the United States
and contained no allegation of a federally registered trade-
mark. In both of these cases, the court specifically denounced
the Stauffer doctrine.2 5
(3) The view, as set out in L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell,
Inc."2 6 was the most recent theory upon which a federal court
based original jurisdiction in an unfair competition case. The
plaintiff based his cause of action on sections 39, 43(a) and
44(b) (h) (i) of the Lanham Act. The court followed the
A.A.A. case as to section 44(b) (h) (i), but went on to say,
however, the complaint clearly states a cause of action under
43(a)2" for false designation of goods in commerce. Appli-
21 Title 28 U.S.C. §1338(b) (Supp. 1952.).
2 2 Sections 39, 44(b) (h) (i) and 45; 60 STAT. 440, 15 U.S.C. §1121 (1946);
60 STAT. 441, 15 U.S.C. §1126(b) (h) (i) (1946); 60 STAT. 443, 15 U.S.C. §1127
(1946).
23 22 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 367, 369-370 (1954)..
24 District courts in Aline with these ideas. Ross Products, Inc. v. Newman,
94 F. Supp. 566 (S.D. N.Y. 1950); Ronson Art Metal Works v. Gibson Lighter
Manufacturing Co., 108 F. Supp. 755 (S.D. N.Y. 1952). These courts also stated
that any other interpretation of the Act, such as the one in the Stauffer case,
contravened the intentions of Congress when they enacted section 1338(b) of the
Judicial Code.
25 See note 13, supra.
26 See note 19, supra.
27 Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any
goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation
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cation of section 43(a) is not a new innovation or inter-
pretation, it has been used in two other cases. In one case,
28
the court gave a remedy for unfair competition in federal
court even though the unfair competition was a cause of action
under state law. The court thus applied section 43(a) in the
remedial area, however, in a Ninth Circuit case,2" it was applied
in the jurisdictional area. It is true that section 43(a) is not
as all-inclusive as the term unfair competition, but for all
practical purposes it covers a large part of the field.
In summarization, of whether the Lanham Act has created a federal
cause of action for unfair competition, we must first attempt to tie in
and reconcile the theory as set out in Stauffer v. Exley with section
1338(b) of the Judicial Code. The Stauffer case held that there is no
contradiction between section 1338(b) and the Lanham Act, because
jurisdiction under the Lanham Act is limited to unfair competition which
affects interstate commerce, and therefore section 1338(b) applied only
to unfair competition which does not affect interstate commerce. In
support of this view, the general rule may be applied that a procedural
statute, such as 1339(b), could not be interpreted so as to impliedly
nullify an important substantive right, such as the Lanham Act."0 This
writer believes, however, that either the Lanham Act never created a
new federal claim or it was repealed by section 1338(b). In Ross Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Newman,3 the conflict between the Lanham Act and section
1338(b) was attempted to be reconciled. The court held that the
Lanham Act has not created a federal cause of action for unfair compe-
tition, but proclaimed that the Act only provided for remedies when the
unfair competition claim was in the federal court on other independent
jurisdictional grounds. This latter theory is also groundless because it is
difficult to find a basis for justifying the idea that subsection (i) is suffi-
cient to give citizens of the United States in cases of unfair competition
the remedies in section 3232 of the Lanham Act but not federal juris-
diction under section 39."
The next problem, is whether the Stauffer and Z4.1 1. cases may
of origin, or any false description or representation, including words or other
symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such
goods or services to enter into commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge
of the falsity of such designation of origin or description or representation cause
or procure the same to be transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to
any carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by any
person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the
region in which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is
or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
28 Dad's Root Beer Co. v. Doc's Beverages, 193 F. 2d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1951).
29 Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F. 2d 923 (9th Cir. 1951).
30 64 HARV. L. REv. 1209, 1211 (1951).
31 94 F. Supp. 566 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
32 60 Stat. 437, 15 U.S.C. §1114 (1946).
33 See note 22, supra.
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be distinguished. In the case of In re Lyndale Farms,3 4 it was held by
the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals that the doctrine
of the Stauffer case may be upheld on the basis that it concerned a trade
name and not a trademark. The difference between the function of a
trademark and a trade name is that the former is to identify and dis-
tinguish a product, whereas the latter is to identify and distinguish a busi-
ness. In re Lyndale Farms based its holding on section 44(g)," which
relates to trade names and states that they "shall be protected without the
obligation of filing or registration whether or not they form parts of
marks". It must be noted that the Stauffer case and the other two court
of appeals cases" 6 of the Ninth Circuit concern trade names while the
A.A.A. case concerns a trademark. This writer believes that this is not a
valid distinction, because section 4 4 (g) is found under the heading of
"[I]nternational Treaties" just as 44(b)(h)(i). As we have seen, the
legislative history of section 4437 was not to create a cause of action be-
tween American citizens or residents. This legislative intent as inter-
preted from the hearings in the sub-committee shows that not only is
44(b) (h) (i) exclusive to suits between foreigners and Americans, but
it also makes 4 4 (g) exclusive. The conelusions to be drawn from the
Lyndale interpretation of section 44 are that the theories profounded are
absolutely without ground. Trademarks and trade names cannot be
differentiated within section 44 because the complete section is headed
"International Treaties", thus applying only to suits between an American
and a foreigner and not to suits strictly -between Americans. The result
being that the Lyndale case stands in a position directly opposite the
A.A.A. decision just as the Staufer case. The only possible effect that
the Lyndale case may have is to delimit the scope of the Stauffer doctrine
in future cases arising in the Ninth Circuit.
In conclusion therefore, it is very doubtful whether the Lanham Act
in any way provides for a federal law of unfair competition. However,
if it may be conclusively found in the future that section 43(a) was
intended to provide for a cause of action in the narrow scope of "false
designation", then a slight area of unfair competition has been filled by
federal law through Congressional enactment. The question still arises
however, whether section 43(a) is substantial enough to independently
support jurisdiction in the federal courts. Therefore, if Congress should
want to enact law completely filling the field of unfair competition, it
would be more logical to expand section 43 than to place it in a remote
corner of section 44. Congress does have the power, to fill the field
completely, that is to regulate any business affecting interstate com-
merce. 
8
4 38 C.C.P.A. 825,186 F. 2d 723, 88 U.S.P.Q. 377 (1951).
35 60 Stat. 441, 15 U.S.C. §1126(g) (1946).
36 Chamberlain and Pagliera Cases, see note 16, supra.
37 Legislative history set out in detail in 22 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 367, 369
(1954).




As a result there is no uniform federal law of unfair competition.
If the intent of Congress was to create a federal law of unfair compe-
tition, either by enacting the Federal Trade Commission Act, section
1338(b) of the Judicial Code, or by the Lanham Act, they should have
done so in a more positive manner. The Federal Trade Commission Act
applies only to suits between the government and an individual; the
courts have never interpreted it to apply to private actions. As to the
potency of section 1338(b) in evolving a federal law of unfair compe-
tition, it must be stated that it neither has any stamina. The Erie doctrine
definitely forecloses federal law in this area. The Stauffer doctrine today,
is in all practicality completely destroyed, that is, except in the Ninth Cir-
cuit. It was a mere fabrication of writers that induced a few judges to
fall in line. Section 44 of the Lanham Act definitely does not create a
federal law of unfair competition. However, section 43, in a few in-
stances perhaps, may be a basis for federal jurisdiction.3" This is very
questionable, however, that is, if Congress intended section 43 to effectu-
ate an area of unfair competition, they should have been more exacting.
The L'APiglon case was not too clear, perhaps the congressional intent in
enacting 43(a) was only to declare the existing common law. The en-
actment of the Lanham Act has further clouded the already hazy area of
unfair competition. Too much has been read in between the lines and the
original legislative intent has been disregarded in many jurisdictions.
Two possibilities of expanding present legislation to meet the turmoil
in the area of unfair competition have been suggested by two commenta-
tors. One commentator advances the idea of expanding section 43 of the
Lanham Act, ° while the other would amend section 1338(b) of the
Judicial Code4 ' and grant federal courts jurisdiction over all unfair
the Lanham Act, a party bringing an action for infringement was required to
establish before he could recover that the infringement was in commerce. Since
the Lanham Act, Congress relying on the Wickard case proclaimed that it merely
must affect commerce.
39The doctrine set out in L'Aiglon Apparel case was followed in Gold Seal
Company v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 939 (D.C. 1955) stating, "We find nothing
in the legislative history of the Lanham Act to justify the view that this section
is merely declarative of existing law. Indeed, because we find no ambiguity in the
relevant language in the statute, we would doubt the propriety of resort to
legislative history even if that history suggested that Congress intended less than
it said. It seems to us that Congress has defined a statutory civil wrong of false
representation of goods in commerce and has given a broad class of suitors injured
or likely to be injured by such wrong the right to relief in the federal courts.
*** But, however similar to or different from pre-existing law, here is a provision
of a federal stature which, with clarity and precision adequate for judicial ad-
ministration, creates and defines rights and duties and provides for their vindi-
cation in the federal courts". (Notice the utter disregard for legislative intent).
4022 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 367, 369 (1954).
41 37 MINN. L. REV. 268, 283 (1953). The theory profounded gives to the
court a right to exercise the power over all business in commerce disregarding
the Erie doctrine.
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competition claims affecting interstate commerce and supplementing this
power with the express right to apply federal law (denouncing Erie v.
Tompkins in pendent jurisdictional cases); the field of unfair compe-
tition would be settled. However, we must remember, it is up to Congress
to carry out either of the above ideas or a completely new innovation
through legislation and it is not up to the courts. For these reasons, a
federal law of unfair competition should be enacted -by Congress, setting
out exact standards, making specific activity unfair. Congress should not
give the courts the broad discretionary power of determining what an
act of unfair competition is by enactdng a general statute, but they should
spell out in minute detail the prerequisites needed so as to label a specific
act or acts unfair competition. The spelling out of these details would
not be speculative and inexact because of the complete requirements set
out in the cases decided under the common law. These common law pre-
requisites should be embodied into statute, creating a code of violations,
enumerating exactly what is unfair competition.
The result therefore is, that courts and commentators should stop
searching for make-shift means by which to gain federal jurisdiction and
to apply federal laws, they should continue to apply state law in cases of
unfair competition and wait the day when Congress will exercise their
power and enact a clear, concise, and complete law of unfair competition.
Martin S. Bogarad
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